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INTRODUCTION  
 
The Pacific Islands region includes some of the smallest States in the world, surrounded 
by the world’s largest ocean. Many of these States are in a precarious condition1 with low 
economic growth, political instability and significant weaknesses in their governments 
and institutions. Economic activity in much of the region is dominated by governments, 
and foreign fishing access agreements and foreign aid comprise significant and tangled 
components of national budgets. While there are many shared concerns within the region 
(particularly over issues such as climate change and fisheries development), there is also 
a great cultural, economic and institutional diversity with large variances between Island 
States in their levels of development, institutional capacity and effectiveness of 
governance. 
 
The economic, governance and institutional weaknesses of the Pacific Islands States 
combine to leave them particularly vulnerable to corruption in the fisheries sector. In 
recent times, there has been a significant concern throughout the Pacific Islands region 
regarding the impact of corruption2 and associated weaknesses in governance on the 
ability of the region to effectively manage and develop its economy.3  In the fisheries 
specific context, some senior fisheries managers and advisers in the region have also 
started highlighting the likely impacts of corruption in the fisheries sector, particular in 
regard to licensing and access agreements, on the sustainability of the fisheries resources 
of the region. The key factor in all of these is the lack of transparency in many fisheries 
decisions, particularly in licensing and access negotiations. Les Clark notes that: 
“Looking ahead, concerns about transparency are not likely to abate. With resources 
becoming scarcer and access to them becoming more valuable, incentives for corrupt 
practices are bound to increase.”4
 
This paper examines fisheries corruption in the Pacific Islands in three specific areas, 
namely licensing, access negotiations and monitoring and enforcement. The paper 
concludes with recommendations for reforms to address corruption concerns in Pacific 
island domestic fisheries management. 
 
                                                 
1 ForSEC. 2005. Enabling Environment – Good Governance and Security. Pacific Plan Regional Analysis 
Papers. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Accessed 18 December 2007. http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-
list_file_gallery.php?galleryId=3  
2 The definition of corruption adopted in this paper is “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain” , 
AusAID, “Tackling Corruption for Growth and Development: A Policy for Australian Development 
Assistance on Anti-Corruption, March 2007,  p.3. 
3 Crocombe, Ron. 2001. The South Pacific. Institute of Pacific Studies. University of the South Pacific. 
Suva. – Hanich, Quentin., Teo, Feleti. and Tsamenyi, Martin. 2007. ‘Closing the Gaps: Building Capacity 
in Pacific Fisheries Governance and Institutions.’ FFA Workshop Information Paper. Honiara. – AusAID. 
2006. – AusAID. 2007. Valuing Pacific Fish: A Framework for fisheries-related development assistance in 
the Pacific. November 2007. Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Canberra. 
4 Clark, L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for 
Coherence, Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 2006, 
p. 89. 
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CONTEXT SETTING: PACIFIC ISLAND REGION AND FISHERIES 
 
The Pacific Islands region is usually used to describe the independent Island States in the 
western and central Pacific Ocean (see map 1 below). Geographically, the region extends 
from French Polynesia in the east to Papua New Guinea in the west.  
 
 
 
The independent States in the region are: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The combined exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 
the Pacific States cover roughly 30,569,000 km² of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (WCPO)5 and include some of its most productive waters. This is in contrast to 
the combined landmass of these Island States of only 552,789 km² (84% is found in 
APUA New Guinea).6  
 
Due largely to this paucity of land and wealth of ocean, the Pacific Island States are 
heavily dependent upon the oceanic and coastal fisheries of the WCPO. While coastal 
fisheries provide important sources of traditional food and income to artisanal 
communities, the oceanic tuna fisheries are the cornerstone upon which many Island 
States depend for revenue and economic activity. Fortunately, the WCPO is home to the 
world’s richest and largest tuna fishery7 with an estimated value of almost US$3.1 
billion.8   
 
                                                 
5 Gillet, Robert. 2005. Pacific Island Countries Region. In Review of the State of World Marine Resources. FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper 457. Rome. FAO. Pp144—157.  
6 Gillet, Robert. 2005. 
7 For the purposes of this paper, the WCPO is defined as those waters within the mandate of the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
8 Reid, C. 2007. Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries. Report to the FFA www.ffa.int Accessed December 2007. 
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The four key tuna species of interest (albacore, skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye) migrate 
across the EEZs and high seas pockets throughout the region. Unlike other tuna fisheries 
in the Atlantic, Indian and Eastern Pacific Oceans, the majority of fishing effort in the 
WCPO occurs within the EEZs of the Pacific Island States, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Approximately 57% of all WCPO catches for the four key tuna species are taken from 
within Pacific Island EEZs9. Pacific Island States depend upon these fisheries as a 
traditional and important source of food; employment (21,000 – 31,000 regional jobs); 
and as a critical form of revenue (AUD$80-90 million in access fees) and income 
(expenditure by locally based vessels is worth approximately AUD$190 million).10  
 
These fisheries are the only significant resource for many Pacific Island States and have 
long been viewed as the primary development opportunity for many of the region’s 
developing Island States. Access fees from foreign fishing vessels deliver much-needed 
financial contributions to governments, while domestically-based foreign fishing fleets 
and support industries make substantial contribution to the national economies of many 
Pacific Islands States.  In some cases revenue from tuna can contribute up to 42% of 
gross domestic product11 (e.g. Kiribati and Tuvalu). Access fees are significant 
components of national economies for 7 of the 14 Pacific Island States.12 Fisheries 
resources have also, to a degree, motivated some distant water fishing States to build and 
maintain political relationships throughout the region that include significant aid budgets. 
However, these complicated relationships can bring a pandora’s box of development, 
governance and foreign policy ramifications.  
 
The two main components of the Pacific Islands tuna fisheries comprise distant water 
fishing vessels and domestic fishing vessels. Distant water fishing vessels may either be 
based within a Pacific Island State (due to licensing requirements) or operate from a 
distant home port. The vast majority of these vessels are from distant water fishing 
nations (DWFN), notably China, Japan, Korea, the United States, Taiwan and 
increasingly, the European Union, who fish within Pacific Island EEZs or on the high 
seas. These vessels operate through access agreements or are directly licensed by the 
coastal States to fish within their EEZ. The annual value of tuna caught by DWFN 
vessels is estimated at approximately US$2 billion.13
 
Domestic fishing vessels are generally smaller vessels that mostly fish for tuna within 
their own flag State’s EEZ. These vessels may be nationally owned and operated, or may 
be foreign owned and operated through domestic charters and/or joint ventures with local 
                                                 
9For the purposes of this estimate, this includes the EEZs of: (FFA members) Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, (and non-FFA members) American Samoa, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Pitcairn 
Island, and the French territory of Wallis and Futuna. The data for this estimate was sourced from: Reid, C. 2007. 
Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries. Report to the FFA www.ffa.int Accessed December 2007. 
10 Gillett, Robert., McCoy, Mike., Rodwell, Len. And Tamate, Josie. 2001. Tuna. A Key Economic Resource in the 
Pacific Island Countries. A Report Prepared for the Asian Development Bank and the Forum Fisheries Agency.  
11 Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. The Contribution of fisheries to the economies of Pacific Island Countries. Report 
prepared for Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency and World Bank. 
12 Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. 
13 ForSEC. 2005. Fisheries. Pacific Plan Regional Analysis Papers. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 
Accessed 18 December 2007. http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-list_file_gallery.php?galleryId=11 
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interests. Charter and/or joint venture arrangements generally specify local participation 
requirements in the venture and require that the vessel be located within the country. 
Most domestic vessels are longliners, but recently there has been an increase in Pacific 
Island flagged or domestic-based purse seiners. The annual value of tuna caught by 
domestic fishing vessels is estimated at approximately US$500 to 700 million.14
 
Over-capacity and over-fishing within the WCPO tuna fisheries (particularly for bigeye 
and yellowfin) are growing concerns and present clear threats to the long term 
sustainability and economic viability of some aspects of the fishery. Over fishing is likely 
to be occurring for both yellowfin and bigeye.15  While neither stock is currently over 
fished, the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission16 has noted concerns regarding the status of these stocks and has 
recommended reductions in fishing mortality for these species at each of its meetings in 
2005, 2006 and 2007. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission has 
adopted conservation measures that limit increases in bigeye and yellowfin catches, but 
has so far been unable to reach consensus on the adoption of measures that meet the 
Scientific Committee’s recommendations of 25% reduction for bigeye and 10% for 
yellowfin. Additionally, economic studies have shown that fishing effort is significantly 
above optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability of the fishery.17
 
While regional arrangements and institutions are inherently necessary due to the 
migratory nature of tuna stocks, implementation of conservation and management 
decisions ultimately falls to national governments. This requires effective governance at 
the national level and the political will to implement, at times, contentious and difficult 
decisions. Weaknesses in governance threaten the long term sustainability of tuna 
resources and significantly reduce the real and potential economic returns to Pacific 
Island States. Furthermore, given the high dependence of many Pacific Island States on 
fisheries resources for revenue and food security, any serious thereat to the sustainability 
of the resource can be viewed as a direct threat to the economic viability and food 
security.  
 
 
GENERAL CONTEXT OF CORRUPTION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
FISHERIES 
 
Analysis of corruption in Pacific Islands fisheries needs to be set within the context of 
corruption generally in the region. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
                                                 
14 ForSEC. 2005. Fisheries. 
15 Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 2005. WCPFC.  
16 Negotiations for the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC) were completed in 2000 with the Convention entering into force in July 
2004. The objective of the WCPFC is ‘... to ensure, through effective management, the long term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance 
with the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. The Convention 
established a decision making Commission (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission) which meets annually, 
and a secretariat which is headquartered in the Federated States of Micronesia. 
17 Bertignac, Michel., Campbell, Harry., Hampton, John., and Hand, Anthony. 2001. Maximising Resource Rent from 
the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries. In Marine Resource Economics. Vol. 15. pp151-177. 
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Project surveys and reports on the performance of countries against six dimensions of 
governance. The table below summarises reports for the past seven years on the 
performance of Pacific Island States against two indicators that are particularly relevant 
to this paper: control of corruption and government effectiveness. Control of corruption 
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. This includes the 
level by which the State may have been ‘captured’ by elites and private interests and both 
petty and grand forms of corruption. Government effectiveness measures the quality of 
public and civil services and the degree to which it is independent from political 
pressures. Other factors include the quality of policy formulation and implementation and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.18 Also included in the 
table is the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 2007. This 
indicates the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and 
country analysts and a country ranking to compare against others. As can be seen below, 
some Pacific Island States have demonstrated considerable improvement while others 
still suffer from significant problems with corruption and their effectiveness of 
government.  
 
Corruption Perception 
2007 - Index 
World Bank Assessment           Control 
of Corruption 
World Bank Assessment   
Government Effectiveness 
  
  
  
10 = highly clean 
0 = highly corrupt 
Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below 
selected country. Higher values indicate better ratings. 
Country Rank CPI 2006 2004 2002 2000 2006 2004 2002 2000 
COOK 
ISLANDS  N/A N/A 72.3 59.2 51.9 54.9 58.3 52.6 49.3 62.1 
FIJI  N/A N/A 45.6 54.9 59.2 62.6 52.6 36.5 63 39.8 
KIRIBATI  84th 3.3 59.2 67 56.3 50.5 35.5 32.2 50.2 53.6 
MARSHALL 
ISLANDS  N/A N/A 38.3 33 18.4 29.1 13.7 14.2 46 16.6 
FED. ST. 
MICRONESIA N/A N/A 50 57.3 43.7 46.1 47.9 31.3 44.1 25.1 
NAURU  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 6.6 7.6 N/A 
NIUE  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 31.8 N/A 23.2 N/A 
PALAU  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 31.8 67.8 43.1 N/A 
PNG 162nd 2 9.2 15.5 28.2 24.3 23.2 24.6 28.9 33.2 
SAMOA  57th 4.5 63.1 59.7 57.3 56.3 57.8 58.8 62.6 66.8 
SOLOMON 
ISLANDS  111
st 2.8 49 36.9 2.9 12.1 18 2.8 12.3 12.3 
TONGA  175th 1.7 5.3 39.8 30.6 34 29.9 28.4 35.1 34.6 
TUVALU  N/A N/A 56.3 71.8 61.2 60.2 45.5 13.3 50.7 70.1 
VANUATU  98th 3.1 62.6 31.6 27.2 23.3 40.3 30.3 45 29.9 
Source for data: World Bank. 2007. Worldwide governance research indicators dataset. Accessed 19 December 2007.  
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp. – Transparency International. 2007. Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Accessed 20 December 2007. http://www.transparency.org/content/download/24104/360217 
 
                                                 
18 Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2006" (July 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999979   
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While there are a diversity of causes and contexts for corruption throughout the Pacific 
Islands region19, these States share a number of general characteristics that leave them 
vulnerable to corruption.  
 
The small size of many of the Pacific Island States creates inherent vulnerabilities. The 
median population of each Pacific Island State is a little over 50,00020 with low electoral 
ratios of parliamentary representatives to citizens (i.e. small electorates where the 
Minister is likely to personally know many, if not most, of his constituents). The small 
size of the communities, and the strong cultural ties, encourage a tendency to promote 
one’s colleagues or relatives over merit based appointments.21 Additionally, politics is 
sometimes viewed as a ‘means to personal wealth.’22  
 
Many of the Pacific Islands States suffer from low economic growth and poverty. 
Economic activity in much of the region is dominated by governments, while foreign 
fishing access agreements and aid funding form significant and tangled components of 
national budgets. The Table below shows the contribution of fisheries to the economies 
of the independent States in the Pacific Islands region. 
 
Aid 
Access 
Fees 
Government 
expenditure 
Government 
Employment 
 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
GDP % of GDP 
% of total paid 
employees 
Fiji 2.3 0.01 19.4 18.7 
Papua New Guinea 6.4 0.17 n/a n/a 
Solomon Islands 25.5 0.1 53.1 32.5 
Vanuatu 11.7 0.1 39.4 33.3 
Cook Islands 3.5 0.21 n/a n/a 
Samoa 10.4 0.08 28 10 
Tonga 16.3 0.1 43.4 41 
Tuvalu 38.6 42.6 n/a n/a 
Kiribati 31.5 42.81 100.6 28.7 
Marshall Islands 53.9 5.12 98.1 46.4 
Fed. St. Micronesia 49.5 6.7 89.8 69.2 
Nauru 35.5 6.59 n/a n/a 
Palau 20.6 0.7 n/a n/a 
Source for data: World Bank, 2002. Pacific Islands Regional Economic Report, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. – Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. The Contribution of fisheries to the economies of Pacific Island 
Countries. Report prepared for Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency and World Bank. – 
AusAID. 2006. Pacific 2020. Challenges and Opportunities for Growth. Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID). Canberra. 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the various causes of corruption identified in the region, Larmour, Peter. 2005. 
Corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands. Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government Discussion 
Paper 05-10. Australian National University. Canberra 
20 Larmour, Peter. 2005. Corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands. Asia Pacific School of Economics and 
Government Discussion Paper 05-10. Australian National University. Canberra.  
21Larmour, Peter. 2005. Corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands. Asia Pacific School of Economics and 
Government Discussion Paper 05-10. Australian National University. Canberra.  
22 Larmour, Peter. 2005. Corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands. Asia Pacific School of Economics and 
Government Discussion Paper 05-10. Australian National University. Canberra.  
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This heavy reliance on aid, often tied up with foreign fishing access agreements, brings 
risks of corruption.23 While some donors are increasingly demanding ‘good governance’ 
and accountability requirements for donor funds, other donors are less demanding. 
Interviewed officials recounted examples of a Pacific Island State that had introduced 
audit legislation in response to donor concerns. This legislation mandated auditing and 
oversight of all expenditure of donor funds from Australia and the United States of 
America. But the legislation specifically excluded aid funds from a particular country 
from any auditing requirements so as to enable a greater ‘flexibility’ in how these funds 
were spent.24  
 
The largest electoral funds in some countries now come from abroad. Especially 
where politicians have excessive discretionary power, such as in issuing licensing 
or exemptions for logging, mining, fishing, franchising stamps or registering 
‘flags of convenience’ ships etc, entrepreneurs who mediate the deals can wield 
alarming political influence.25
 
The dependence by Pacific Island States upon foreign aid also leaves these States highly 
vulnerable to manipulations by foreign powers. For example, the ongoing ‘turf war’ 
between China and Taiwan in the region  has been blamed for increasing corruption, as 
neither side is playing by the normal rules of the ‘aid game’ in the Pacific.26 According to 
one senior official in the region, ‘chequebook diplomacy has crossed the line from buying 
diplomatic influence to fostering corruption in domestic politics.’27
 
Finally, the political and legislative structures inherited or developed by many of the 
Pacific Island States did not adequately consider the local context and how such a 
government might work within the local culture.28 Consequently, many Pacific Island 
States are governed by political structures that are overly complex for the local context, 
do not work effectively and are prone to corruption, nepotism and ‘clientelism’. A high 
level of diversity within the region also means that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
government model that would best serve the interests of every Pacific Island State.  
 
 
CASE STUDIES OF CORRUPTION IN PACIFIC ISLAND FISHERIES  
 
There is clearly a significant concern throughout the Pacific Islands region regarding the 
impact of corruption and associated weaknesses in governance on the ability of the region 
                                                 
23 Larmour, Peter. 2006  
24 Confidential personal communication. Interviewed 7 December. 2007. 
25 Crocombe, Ron. 2001. 
26 Dobell, Graeme. 2007. China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political 
Rugby. Lowy Institute Policy Brief. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Sydney. 
27 Dobell, Graeme. 2007. 
28 AusAID. 2005,Pacific 2020 Background paper: Political governance. Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID). Canberra. – ForSEC. 2005. 
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to effectively manage and develop its fisheries.29 Corruption has effectively stolen much 
needed funds that should have gone into national accounts and local communities, 
undermined negotiating positions by Pacific island States, and weakened the ability of 
Pacific island States to benefit from their fisheries resources. 
 
In recent years there has been a noticeable rise in fisheries-related corruption in 
some of the countries of the region - as judged from complaints from the private 
sector, court convictions, action by public service commissions, and observations 
by knowledgeable individuals.30
 
Although corruption in the fisheries sector in the Pacific islands region is widely believed 
to be widespread, there is very little evidence to substantiate the claim, apart from recent 
instances of court convictions and findings by commissions of inquiry in Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands (see below). 
 
There are three areas within Pacific island fisheries where corruption impacts are most 
significant: licensing; access agreements; and monitoring and inspection. Within these 
areas, corrupt practices occur at both official and ministerial levels of government and 
involve both domestic and foreign operations (though the vast majority of allegations 
cited corruption involving Asian foreign fishing fleets). Fisheries corruption occurs in 
different forms. Some corrupt practices are ‘low level’, involving gifts of fish and 
products and episodes of small scale nepotism. Other corrupt practices occur at a ‘grand’ 
level’ that involves regular large scale financial transactions, organized criminal 
behaviour and political interference in official processes. These ‘grand’ examples can 
include high level Ministerial participation in the corrupt fishing venture and the shadowy 
support of foreign governments.  
 
Corruption in Licensing  
 
The ability of a coastal State to manage its fisheries resources in a sustainable manner is 
dependent upon its effective control of fishing activities through licensing. An effective 
licensing framework also determines the coastal State’s ability to gain a reasonable 
economic return from the fisheries. Despite some reforms, licensing continues to 
challenge many Pacific island States who suffer from serious shortcomings in their 
governance of licensing, licensing processes and systems, and their relevant institutions, 
with a number of allegations raised in various Pacific Island States regarding suspicions 
of corruption.  
 
In many respects, the legislative and administrative frameworks for fisheries in most of 
the countries provide a favourable condition for corruption. In many of these States, the 
                                                 
29 Crocombe, Ron. 2001. The South Pacific. Institute of Pacific Studies. University of the South Pacific. 
Suva. – Hanich, Quentin., Teo, Feleti. and Tsamenyi, Martin. 2007. ‘Closing the Gaps: Building Capacity 
in Pacific Fisheries Governance and Institutions.’ FFA Workshop Information Paper. Honiara. – AusAID. 
2006. – AusAID. 2007. Valuing Pacific Fish: A Framework for fisheries-related development assistance in 
the Pacific. November 2007. Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Canberra. 
30 Gillett, Robert. 2007. Pers Comm. 20 December 2007. 
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legislative framework for licensing can best be described as a “one-man” system in which 
fisheries legislation vest exclusive and power, with wide discretion, in either the minister 
responsible for fisheries or a licensing officer (usually a senior fisheries official) to issue 
licenses for both foreign and domestic fishing vessels. The licenses so issued provide the 
only means of verifiable authorization to fish.  ‘One-man’ licensing processes are 
particularly vulnerable to corruption and do not include adequate opportunities for review 
or processing.  
 
Alleged and proven cases  of corruption through the issue of fishing licenses include 
Ministers and senior fisheries officials directing license  fees into overseas private bank 
accounts or receiving direct payments from overseas fishing companies in return for 
favourable license conditions and ‘private’ licensing by fisheries officials of vessels that 
do not show up on the government books. Two recent revelations from public enquiries 
into corruption in the Solomon Islands and Fiji Fisheries Ministries are representative of 
allegations in many Pacific Island countries. 
 
Auditor-General Report into Solomon Islands Fisheries Department 
 
Following numerous allegations from the public and the fishing industry, the Solomon 
Islands Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, Nelson Kile was compelled to 
reveal in Parliament in 2005 that a number of permanent secretaries were dismissed by 
the government following what he described as “the siphoning of license fees to pay 
individuals”. The Minister also revealed that “there was a transfer of money from License 
fees to a special account, which was then paid to some individuals in various ministries”.  
An Auditor-General’s Report into the Department subsequently revealed that  the country 
lost over  US$4 million through diversion of money, misappropriation, offsetting license 
fee income, unpaid fishing license fees and understatement of reported actuals. The 
Report also It also highlighted a systemic corruption, particularly by locally based foreign 
fishing companies. Some of the specific corrupt practices identified include license 
payments to fisheries officials in cash, most of which could not be accounted for and 
telegraphic transfers from companies traced into personal accounts of senior fisheries 
officials and or their spouses’ accounts.31  
 
Committee of Inquiry into Fiji’s Ministry of Fisheries  
 
Allegations of corruption over licensing decisions at senior official and Ministerial levels 
have been frequently made by the Fiji Tunaboat Association.  Most of these allegations 
were in relation to attempts by foreign charter companies to buy licenses during a period 
when the Fijian fishery was over-fished and capacity reductions were required. In 2004, 
the government set up a special Committee of Inquiry to the Ministry of Fisheries to 
investigate the allegations. In early 2005, the Committee confirmed what the industry had 
been saying for many years. Two senior fisheries officials, including the then Director of 
                                                 
31 Solomon Star, 14 November 2005 
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Fisheries, were found to have engaged in the corrupt issuing of fishing licenses and were 
subsequently jailed.32
 
 
Negotiation of Access agreements 
 
For many Pacific Islands States, the principal means of deriving revenue from their 
fisheries resources is through access agreements with distant water fishing nations. Such 
agreements usually take one of three forms, namely: government to government 
agreements, government to industry agreements and government to enterprise 
agreements.33  Access agreements in their current form were strategic responses by many 
developing coastal States to the declaration of extended fisheries zones in the late 1970s 
and subsequently EEZs under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Clark notes that: 
“For coastal States, there were a number of reasons for the move towards managing 
foreign fishing through access agreements rather than through more direct licensing 
arrangements. They include securing recognition of coastal State jurisdiction and rights, 
compliance and economic gain.”34 Regardless of form, all access agreements require 
negotiation between the coastal State and officials or industry representatives from the 
fishing State. In most Pacific Island States, legislation mandates that access agreements 
be subject to renegotiation on annual basis. Quite often in many Pacific Island States, this 
annual renegotiation of access agreements takes place in the distant water fishing nation. 
 
Allegations of corruption of Pacific Islands officials during access agreement 
negotiations take a variety of forms, including: payment of business and first class air 
tickets for officials and their spouses; the provision of generous per diems and lavish 
hotel accommodation and entertainment, often in the foreign country; extended holidays 
and side-trips for Pacific Islands senior officials and their spouses after access 
negotiations; and payment of overseas tuition fees for the children of  Ministers.  
 
To a large extent, the lack of transparency of access agreements invites such allegations 
of corruption.  Les Clark summarises the nature and cause of the problem cogently: 
 
The problems are deep-seated. Firstly, the negotiation of access agreements is 
almost inevitably a secretive process. Part of the rationale for using access 
agreements rather than direct licensing is that it is possible to have different fee 
levels to counties where the fishing opportunities are essentially similar. But that 
approach usually requires at least the commercial aspects of the agreements to be 
kept confidential… 
 
                                                 
32 Radio New Zealand International, “Two Fiji Fisheries officials found guilty in corruption probe”, 
http:www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=15465. 
33Martin, Will, et all, A handbook for Negotiating Fishing Access Agreements, WWF, 2001, p.39; Clark, 
L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for Cohehence, 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 2006, p. 76. 
34 Clark, L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for 
Cohehence, Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 
2006, p. 76. 
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And even where the agreement texts are public, the negotiations themselves are 
usually closed. More seriously perhaps, in countries where access agreements are 
important, the approach to negotiating access agreements is also reflected in the 
legislation governing all fisheries decisions. For example, one element of the 
strategy developed in the 1980s for developing coastal States was to give very great 
legal authority to a single Minister or official not just to negotiate access 
agreements but also to grant, suspend or terminate licenses and to attach conditions 
to license4s as a way of strengthening the position of those responsible to deal with 
powerful foreign fishing interest. With resources becoming scarcer and access to 
them becoming more valuable, incentives for corrupt practices are bound to 
increase and impatience with the kind of secrecy that attends access agreements 
also can be expected to increase.35
 
Monitoring and Inspection 
 
Monitoring and inspection of vessel logbooks and catches is critical to the collection of 
important data, effective management of a fishery and ensuring that licensing conditions 
are complied with and appropriate revenue is collected. Examples of corruption in 
monitoring and inspection can include ‘low level’ corrupt activities where port inspectors 
might be offered a large tuna in return for ‘going easy’ on the vessel and not verifying 
logbooks through inspections, or turning a blind eye to infractions with license 
conditions. Other examples include ‘high level’ activities where officials have a financial 
interest in ensuring that vessel infractions are not reported and that ‘their’ boats are 
favoured. In one example, a domestic fishing industry spokesman complained of harsh 
treatment of his skippers by a specific fisheries officer and expressed concerns that this 
fisheries officer, who was a shareholder in a foreign joint venture fishing company, was 
supplying their commercially sensitive catch data to foreign charter vessels: 
 
‘… in light of recent allegations, one wonders why we even give our catch data at 
all, especially when our skippers complain about being on good fishing only to 
soon be surrounded by (blank) fishing vessels.’36
 
In another example, one fishing vessel had failed to operate its satellite vessel monitoring 
system (VMS) for four months. Eventually the vessel was required to call into port to 
have its VMS fixed before it would be allowed to continue fishing. The instruction was 
quickly overturned by the Minister following contact from overseas.37
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Clark, L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for 
Cohehence, Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 
2006, p. 89. 
36 Confidential personal communication. 18 December 2003. 
37 Hanich, Quentin., Teo, Feleti. and Tsamenyi, Martin. 2007. ‘Closing the Gaps: Building Capacity in 
Pacific Fisheries Governance and Institutions.’ FFA Workshop Information Paper. Honiara, p.34 
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GOVRNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION IN THE 
PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 
 
Corruption in the fisheries sector in the Pacific Islands region is part and parcel of the 
wider problem of corruption in the region. It is therefore important that efforts to stem 
fisheries corruption are considered within the wider national and regional context.  Over 
the last few years, there have been a number of regional and specific national initiatives 
to address corruption generally in the Pacific Islands region through mechanisms such as 
the implementation of Leadership Codes.  Many of these initiatives, if successful, would 
also assist in combating corruption ion the fisheries sector.  
 
In 2005, the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed a Pacific Plan that would form the basis of 
ongoing strengthening of regional cooperation and integration. In 2006, the Plan was 
updated and specific priorities were identified. Amongst other things, these priorities 
included regional support to consolidate commitments to key institutions such as audit 
and ombudsman offices, leadership codes, anti-corruption institutions and departments of 
attorneys general; including through judicial training and education to address 
corruption.38
 
Similarly, in March 2007 the Australian Government, through its international 
development agency, AusAID, issued its policy blueprint entitled “Tackling corruption 
for growth and development: A Policy for Australian Development Assistance on anti 
Corruption”. Although the policy does not address any fisheries specific issues, many of 
the measures highlighted have significant relevance to corruption in the fisheries sector. 
The measures include: supporting civil society groups such as churches and the media to 
gather information on of incidences corruption and to promote awareness of anti-corrupt 
behaviour, establishing cooperative relationships with corporate entities, chambers of 
commerce and professional associations to promote integrity, ethical conduct and 
transparency in the private sector, funding and resourcing civic education and supporting 
legal and institutional reforms.39  
 
In the fisheries specific context, some Pacific Islands countries have also taken quasi- 
judicial and judicial measures to address corruption.  As noted previously, both Fiji and 
the Solomon Islands established official inquiries into corruption in the respective 
departments of fisheries following widespread public allegations of corruption in these 
departments. In Fiji, the findings of the Committee of Inquiry in 2005 resulted in the 
prosecution and conviction of two senior fisheries officials.40  In 2005, the Solomon 
Islands an Auditor General’s investigation into that country’s fisheries Ministry revealed 
                                                 
38 Pacific Islands Forum. 2006. The Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration 
(updated October 2006). Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Accessed 18 December 2007. 
http://www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/The%20Pacific%20Plan,%20updated%20Dec%202006.p
df 
39 Australian Government, Tackling corruption for growth and development: A Policy for Australian 
Development Assistance on Anti Corruption”, March 2007, pp. 9-10. 
40 See Radio New Zealand International, “Two Fiji Fisheries officials found guilty in corruption probe”, 
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=15465. 
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several instances of corruption by fisheries officials and resulted in the dismissal and 
prosecution of many senior officials. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
 
Fishing activities, particularly licensing and the operations of foreign fishing vessels are 
“distant” and are generally out of the public view as most of the vessels  operate far at sea 
and barely come to the ports of the host country, except to refuel. This unique 
characteristic of fisheries makes it easier for fisheries officials and ministers to engage in 
corrupt license deals.  This situation has been compounded by the fact that fisheries 
legislation has historically vested exclusive and discretionary power in either a minister 
of a senior fisheries official to issue licenses, a factor identified as one of the major 
causes of corruption in fisheries decisions. Improving the transparency of fisheries 
decision-making, particularly licensing, access negotiations and monitoring and 
compliance is fundamental to addressing corruption in Pacific Islands fisheries. Some of 
the specific measures that may assist in this regard include: 
 
1. Establishing Committees to make licensing decisions: The licensing process 
most resilient to corruption and ministerial interference are those that mandate 
committee or board review/endorsement of licensing decisions and remove the 
Minister from any role in licensing. Corrupting a committee or a board will be 
much harder than corrupting an individual. Reform of the licensing system should 
“involve legal and administrative reforms to codify and formalize licensing 
processes. This should include broadening the responsibilities for licensing and 
setting of fees and other conditions that involve agencies such as financial and 
legal authorities so that the responsibilities do not lie with a single Minister  or 
senior official.”41Some Pacific Islands governments have recognized this and 
have implemented measures to reform the fisheries licensing system. For 
example, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have both introduced sophisticated licensing 
arrangements that require multiple reviews and checks by committees, with 
greater levels of transparency. Papua New Guinea lists all licensed fishing vessels 
on a publicly available website while Fiji will provide information to stakeholders 
on whether vessels hold a license to support detection of illegal fishing.  
 
• Public Disclosure of Licensing Details: To ensure transparency in the licensing 
system and to reduce incidences of corruption, another strategy may be to require 
public disclosure of licensing details so that the decisions on whom licenses are 
granted to, and the terms and conditions of licenses, can be subject to public 
scrutiny.42 This suggestion has already been adopted by Papua New Guinea 
                                                 
41 Clark, L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for 
Cohehence, Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 
2006, p. 89. 
42 Clark, L., “Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreement; Developing Country Views”, in Fishing for 
Cohehence, Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, OECD, 
2006, p. 89. 
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which publishes the list of licensed vessels on the website of the National 
Fisheries Authority.  
 
• Public Disclosure of Access agreements: Transparency in the negotiation of 
access agreements also requires serious attention to reduce the possibilities of 
official corruption. Transparency in the negotiation of access agreements can be 
achieved for example, by requiring that all negotiations take place in the coastal 
State and that the “texts of access agreements be freely and fully available to the 
public.”43   
 
• Strengthening fisheries governance: Institutional quality is one of the key 
factors in the ability of a country to manage corruption. Despite the socio-
economic importance of fisheries resources to Pacific Island States, most national 
fisheries institutions throughout the region are poorly resourced and face daunting 
management challenges. Some national fisheries institutions simply do not have 
the necessary resources, capacity, legislation and/or political will to implement 
fisheries management limits and controls, meet national management goals, or 
implement their international and regional obligations. Additionally, many of the 
fisheries institutions throughout the region are hamstrung by unworkable 
conditions for staff, low pay, poor political engagement, inadequate funding, lack 
of skills, limited career opportunities, and inadequate operational budgets. These 
governance and institutional weaknesses undermine the ability of Pacific Island 
governments to address the root causes of corruption in fisheries. The impact of 
these weaknesses on corruption is exacerbated in some countries by declining 
standards of professionalism and ethical conduct within the public service, and a 
lack of public service training in good governance.44 Corruption in fisheries 
cannot be effectively combated without efforts by national governments and 
donor agencies to address these governance weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
43 Martin, Will, et all, A handbook for Negotiating Fishing Access Agreements, WWF, 2001, p.39. 
44 Roughan, Paul. 2004. Transparency International Country Study Report: Solomon Islands. Transparency 
International Australia. Blackburn South. Australia. 
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